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In 1998–1999, the Baltimore TB control program detected a cluster of 21 tuberculosis (TB) cases. Patients
reported frequent travel to various East Coast cities. An investigation was conducted to determine whether
transmission of the same Mycobacterium tuberculosis strain was occurring in these other localities. A col-
laborative investigation among federal, state, and local TB controllers included TB record reviews, inter-
views of patients, and restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) analysis of selected M.
tuberculosis isolates from diagnosed TB patients in several cities in 1996–2001. A national TB genotyping
database was searched for RFLP patterns that matched the outbreak pattern. Eighteen additional out-
break-related cases were detected outside of Baltimore—the earliest diagnosed in New Jersey in 1996,
and the most recent in New York City in late 2001. The outbreak demonstrates the need for strategies to
detect links among patients diagnosed with TB across multiple TB control jurisdictions.
uberculosis (TB) rates have been declining in the United
States since 1993; they reached a low of 5.6 cases per
100,000 population in 2001 (1). To continue this downward
trend and eventually achieve the national goal of TB elimina-
tion (<1 case per 1 million population per year), ongoing trans-
mission of Mycobacterium tuberculosis in social networks
needs to be detected earlier (2). When transmission patterns
include interstate travel, the epidemiologic connections among
TB patients from different localities are often unrecognized,
thus inhibiting the ability of local TB controllers to identify a
widespread outbreak. New methods that overcome this logisti-
cal difficulty will facilitate TB control in this era of increased
mobility among difficult-to-reach populations.
Genetic typing methods to differentiate strains of M. tuber-
culosis are useful in identifying disease clusters resulting from
recent transmission (3–5). Beginning in August 1999, the Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) facilitated a
cross-jurisdictional investigation of a TB outbreak first recog-
nized in Baltimore, Maryland, and described by Sterling et al.
(6). We present results of this extended investigation that
uncovered 18 additional outbreak cases after the original 21
were described. Most of these additional patients lived outside
the state of Maryland. The outbreak demonstrates the value of
a system that allows M. tuberculosis strains to be compared
across TB control jurisdictions, particularly in situations where
unique social and cultural circumstances hinder conventional
approaches to contact investigations and control efforts.
Methods
Baltimore Outbreak Profile
Between June 1998 and June 1999, TB was diagnosed in
13 young-adult, U.S.-born African-Americans in Baltimore,
Maryland; 8 (62%) were HIV positive. Their M. tuberculosis
isolates shared a common 11-band DNA fingerprint (6). Upon
a review of the National Tuberculosis Genotyping and Surveil-
lance Network database (7), two additional Maryland patients
were found to have isolates matching this cluster. Baltimore
investigators also suspected that two TB patients in New York
City were part of this cluster, a fact that was later verified
through genotyping of the patients’ isolates. Among these
patients with culture-confirmed TB (age range 18–35 years),
all but one were associated with the transgender community
(6). The transgender persons were members of a “house,” a
social organization of young-adult transgender persons. House
members do not necessarily reside together but regularly
engage in dance and dressing competitions known as “balls.”
A network of several dozen houses exists on the U.S. East
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Coast (McElroy, unpub. data). Owing to house members’
reported travel patterns, Baltimore investigators suspected that
transmission of this same 11-band strain was occurring in
other areas, particularly New York City, New Jersey, Atlanta,
Boston, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. In
August 1999, CDC epidemiologists initiated an interstate
investigation of this outbreak. 
Genetic Typing
Restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) analy-
sis (DNA fingerprinting) of M. tuberculosis isolates was per-
formed according to standard methods (8). RFLP patterns
were considered to match if the patterns were identical or dif-
fered by the addition or subtraction of a single band.
Search of National Tuberculosis
Genotyping Network Database
An image of the 11-band Baltimore outbreak strain was
compared to RFLP images in the TB genotyping network data-
base at CDC. This database contains >6,000 unique fingerprint
images collected in the period January 1996–December 2000
from Arkansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jer-
sey, five counties in Texas, and the San Francisco Bay area.
Images were analyzed with BioImage Whole Band Analyzer
software, version 3.4 (Genomic Solutions, Inc, Ann Arbor,
MI). Pairs of patterns were compared for matching bands by
using a deviation of ±2.5% for molecular weight of each band.
Patterns were clustered by using the unweighted pair group
method with arithmetic averages (UPGMA/Average) linkage.
All matches were verified by visual comparison. 
New York City Investigation
Before 2001,  New York City did not routinely perform
RFLP analysis. RFLP was retrospectively performed on iso-
lates obtained from 1998 to 2000 from TB patients with demo-
graphic characteristics similar to those of the Baltimore
outbreak patients (9). After New York City patients associated
with the outbreak were identified, their addresses were cross-
matched with the entire New York City TB registry. RFLP
analysis was performed on isolates from any patient with a
street address matching an outbreak-related case. Beginning in
January 2001, RFLP analysis was routinely performed on iso-
lates from all TB patients diagnosed in New York City.
Other City Investigations
In Atlanta and Philadelphia, TB charts of patients fitting
the outbreak profile were reviewed, and RFLP analyses were
performed on isolates from patients strongly suspected of
being part of the outbreak. All isolates from Boston and San
Francisco are included in the National Tuberculosis Genotyp-
ing and Surveillance Network database, which was searched
for matches. San Francisco, although part of the genotyping
network, also had a database of additional images from cases
preceding 1996. Health authorities in Washington, D.C., did
not participate in this investigation.
Epidemiologic Investigations
A member of the outbreak investigation team contacted
patients with isolates found to have an RFLP pattern matching
the outbreak strain. Patients or next-of-kin (for deceased per-
sons) were interviewed, either by telephone or in person. A
questionnaire was used to assess regular travel destinations,
ball attendance, cross-dressing behaviors, and membership in
a house. 
Results
As of December 31, 2001, this TB outbreak included 39
patients (36 with culture-confirmed disease) from New Jersey,
Maryland, New York City, and Baltimore (Figure). RFLP
analysis of the 36 M. tuberculosis isolates indicated a match-
ing 11-band pattern in 34 isolates; 2 isolates shared the same
11-band pattern plus 1 additional band. All isolates were sus-
ceptible to first-line anti-TB medications. Clinical and demo-
graphic characteristics are presented in Tables 1 and 2,
respectively.
New Jersey
The initial search of the 6,000 RFLP images in the network
database in August 1999 yielded two New Jersey isolates that
matched the outbreak strain. The earliest matching RFLP pat-
tern came from an isolate cultured in November 1996 from a
17-year-old woman (patient 3), the sister of a culture-negative
7-year-old girl (patient 2) with clinical TB that had been diag-
nosed earlier that year (Figure). The second match was an iso-
late from a 33-year-old woman whose TB was diagnosed in
1997 (patient 5). These three patients were contacts from
either the household (patients 2 and 3) or workplace (patient 5)
of a 24-year-old man (patient 1) in whom pulmonary TB was
diagnosed in 1995, one year preceding initiation of the geno-
typing network in New Jersey. Thus, although no isolate was
available from case-patient 1 at the time of the 1999–2000 out-
break investigation, he was epidemiologically linked to this
outbreak. This patient reported a history of frequent travel to
Figure. Epidemic curve representing 38 tuberculosis patients associ-
ated with an outbreak involving the cities of Baltimore and New York
and the states of Maryland and New Jersey, 1995-2001. *Numbered
boxes represent additional patients detected after the investigation was
extended beyond Baltimore (August 1999). Unnumbered patients (and
patient 28) were previously described by Sterling et al. (6).TUBERCULOSIS GENOTYPING NETWORK
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New York, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Atlanta to attend and
compete in balls but denied ever being a member of a house
and had no identified link to any outbreak cases. The most
recent New Jersey patient associated with this outbreak was a
transsexual who had undergone male-to-female transition sur-
gery (patient 30); her case of TB had been diagnosed in Sep-
tember 1999, and she died in early 2000. As of this writing
(mid-2002), no other New Jersey isolates match the outbreak
strain.
New York City
RFLP analyses performed on 235 isolates from selected
patients diagnosed in 1998–2000 identified seven additional
patients (nos. 6, 8, 13, 25, 27, 31, and 36) not previously rec-
ognized as being associated with each other or any outbreak
case-patients in Baltimore. Interviews indicated that all
patients but one (patient 31) were part of the same transgender
network described in the Baltimore outbreak. TB was diag-
nosed in patient 6 in the same month as the case in the Balti-
more index patient. The address cross-match identified patient
31, a 1-year old boy who resided in an apartment across the
hallway from patient 28. The child’s isolate had an RFLP pat-
tern matching the outbreak strain. Neither patient’s list of iden-
tified contacts included the other patient’s name. 
Since January 2001, two additional outbreak cases have
been identified from New York City after implementation of
universal RFLP analysis for isolates obtained from all TB
patients in that city. Patient 36 is the only Latino thus far asso-
ciated with the outbreak. The latest known patient associated
with this outbreak (patient 39) was an HIV-coinfected trans-
sexual who had not undergone sex change surgery; plural TB
was diagnosed in September 2001. 
Maryland
Two additional cases were diagnosed in Maryland after the
original report, both in persons from counties bordering Balti-
more City. A 42-year-old man with meningeal TB (patient 34)
died before he could be interviewed regarding his association
with other persons in the outbreak, and his family has not
cooperated with this investigation. A 46-year-old woman
(patient 37) relocated from New Jersey to Maryland just
before her TB diagnosis. The RFLP pattern of her isolate
matched the outbreak strain, and subsequent interviews (cor-
roborated by employment records) revealed that in 1995-96
she worked as a custodian at the same county hospital in New
Jersey where patient 1 was hospitalized for TB, on the same
floor.
Table 1. Clinical characteristics of tuberculosis outbreak patients, New Jersey, New York City, Baltimore, and Maryland, 1995–2001
Characteristic New Jersey (n=5) New York City (n=10) Baltimore (n=18) Maryland (n=6) Total (n=39) (%)
Culture-positive 4 10 17 5 36 (92)
Sputum smear–positive 1 4 9 3 17 (44)
Disease site
Pulmonary only 2 5 11 4 22 (56)
Extrapulmonary only 0 2 4 2 8 (21)
Pulmonary-extrapulmonary 3 3 3 0 9 (23)
Cavitary disease 0 0 2 1 3 (8)
HIV status
Positive 2 7 11 1 21 (54)
Unknown 1 0 1 1 3 (8)
Deceaseda 2 2 1 1 6 (15)
aFour of six patients died within 3 months of their TB diagnosis.
Table 2. Demographic and social characteristics of tuberculosis outbreak patients, New Jersey, New York City, Baltimore, and Maryland, 
1995–2001
Characteristic New Jersey (n=5) New York City (n=10) Baltimore (n=18) Maryland (n=6) Total (n=39) (%)
Median age, yrs (range) 20 (6–33) 30 (1–40) 24 (19–43) 33 (21–46) 26 (1–46)
African-American 4 9 18 5 36 (92)
Born as male 2 10 14 4 30 (77)
House member 1 7 11 0 19 (49)
Pediatric patient 2 1 0 0 3 (8)
Foreign born 1 0 1 0 2 (5)
aProbable nosocomial exposure for one of these two patients occurred at a New Jersey hospital before the patient’s relocation to Maryland.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 11, November 2002 1255
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Baltimore
Since the first report (6), three additional TB patients with
isolates matching the outbreak strain have been diagnosed in
Baltimore. Both male patients (patients 33 and 38) were asso-
ciated with the transgender network. One female patient
(patient 35) had contact with a son of the nightclub owner
whose club was frequented by most outbreak patients.
Other Sites
RFLP analysis performed on available isolates from
patients fitting the outbreak profile in Atlanta (n=26) and Phil-
adelphia (n=3) found that none matched the outbreak strain.
RFLP patterns of four San Francisco isolates from the pre-
1996 database closely resembled the outbreak strain. These
isolates were retyped in 2001 but did not match the outbreak
strain. No isolates from Massachusetts or other TB genotyping
network sites matched the outbreak strain. 
Discussion
Ongoing transmission of M. tuberculosis in this outbreak
occurred in multiple jurisdictions for at least 4 years (1996–
1999). Early recognition of this outbreak by the City of Balti-
more TB Control Program staff and their suspicion of a larger
outbreak network beyond that city were critical to the initia-
tion of the multistate investigation. The transient nature of the
outbreak’s social network within Baltimore and the members’
propensity for frequent travel and shared accommodations in
other cities created an opportunity for extensive transmission
of M. tuberculosis. Subsequently, the high prevalence of HIV
coinfection within this population led to an increased likeli-
hood of progression from latent TB infection to TB disease
(10). Through the detection of isolates with matching RFLP
patterns, followed by interviews with patients regarding their
travel to and participation in transgender social events, TB
controllers were able to plan and implement specific interven-
tions for this population. Outbreak-associated cases continue
to be detected. Continued transmission of this strain is possi-
ble, given that pleural disease was diagnosed in a 29-year-old
HIV-coinfected patient in September 2001. 
DNA fingerprinting of M. tuberculosis isolates has proven
to be an extremely useful tool for tracking transmission of var-
ious genotypes throughout communities. This technology has
a demonstrated role in investigations of transmission within
facilities such as prisons (11), hospitals (12), other localized
settings such as homeless shelters (13), or in individual states
(14). However, few studies have used RFLP to uncover out-
break networks across geographic areas this large. The predic-
tive value of RFLP patterns to document recent M.
tuberculosis transmission and the relatedness of isolates is
often considered stronger in outbreak settings in which links
among patients are known (14). This investigation demon-
strated that, after a general demographic profile was estab-
lished among a group of TB patients (e.g., 18- to 35-year-old,
HIV-positive, African-American men) from one locality, typ-
ing of isolates from other localities allowed investigators to
successfully uncover additional matching isolates from
patients with characteristics similar to those of the Baltimore
cluster. This outbreak demonstrated the value of periodically
comparing RFLP fingerprint patterns beyond local jurisdic-
tions to establish whether transmission of a particular strain
extends to a broader geographic area. During the second quar-
ter of 1998, four cases with isolates retrospectively matching
the outbreak strain were diagnosed in Baltimore and New York
City. By early 1998, the national TB genotyping network data-
base already included at least three isolates from New Jersey
and Maryland that matched the outbreak strain. Earlier recog-
nition of the common sociodemographic links among the ini-
tial case-patients in multiple localities might have averted the
subsequent cases diagnosed between 1999 and the present.
Casual transmission of M. tuberculosis is defined as trans-
mission from an infectious TB patient to persons who are not
household, work, school, or close contacts (15). This outbreak
included three patients with isolates matching the RFLP pat-
tern of the outbreak strain but with no identified epidemiologic
link to other cases, despite extensive investigation. One should
be cautious about viewing cases with no clear epidemiologic
link as evidence of casual transmission. These patients’ denial
of any association with the outbreak network may be a conse-
quence of the secretive nature of some transgender persons,
who are often ostracized by society. Some of the male out-
break patients appeared as women only on occasion, and oth-
erwise assimilated into their jobs or schools as men. Many of
the transgender patients also engaged in commercial sex work,
another potential source of exposure for patients with no iden-
tifiable ties to other outbreak patients.
The detection of matching RFLP patterns alone was insuf-
ficient to allow investigators to fully characterize the social
network in which transmission was occurring. As RFLP analy-
sis of M. tuberculosis isolates is performed on a routine basis
in large urban areas (e.g., New York City), case-clusters will
continue to emerge. As this happens, TB controllers will be
expected to direct interventions toward these apparent clusters.
Our investigation confirmed that simply detecting a disease
cluster, without describing and understanding the social milieu
supporting transmission, can lead to incomplete and inefficient
TB control. Cutting-edge molecular tools can be enhanced by
equally novel epidemiologic approaches. The role of alterna-
tive epidemiologic methods such as network analysis, used in
tandem with DNA fingerprint analysis, warrants further inves-
tigation (16,17). 
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